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Lexit and the Mystifications of Political Economy

In this chapter, I argue that Lexit’s critique of the European Union is rooted in a pre-critical 
understanding of political economy. By ‘pre-critical’, I refer to Lexit’s use of concepts that 
are abstracted from social relations and that ignore work in critical political economy, from 
Marx onward. It is this abstraction that, in turn, leaves Lexit open to the accusation of 
mystification. I argue further, that the consequence of this mystification is that Lexit’s stat-
ed remedies for what it sees as the failings of the European Union reproduces rather than 
solves the problems they believe its proponents have identified.

The Meaning of Mystification 
For my purposes, ’mystification’ turns on the distinction between pre-critical and critical 
political economy. It hinges on the idea that the former obscures and, in so doing, mysti-
fies the nature of capitalist social relations. Pre-critical political economy  presents the 1
social world as relations between people and things, whereas critical political economy 
understands social relations as relations between people, mediated by things.  
2
For pre-critical political economy, conflict between capital and labour takes place at the 
moment of exchange of the finished product. Critical political economy, on the other 
hand, recognises that the capital/labour relationship is not restricted to that one moment, 
but rather, is present throughout the labour process necessary for producing the com-
 Those that can be included in this category are ‘classical political economists, i.e. Adam Smith 1
and David Ricardo, as well as more ‘radical’ thinkers, i.e. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Jean-Bap-
tiste Say.
 Included in this category is Hegel and Marx and those writing in the tradition. See; Robert Fine, 2
Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the Legal Form (first published 1987; The 
Blackstone Press, 2002); Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx and Arendt (Routledge, 2001); Gil-
lian Rose, Hegel contra Sociology (first published 2001; Verso, 2009); Moishe Postone, Time, 
Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory; (CUP; 2008); Matt 
Bolton and Frederick Harry Pitts, Corbynism: A Critical Approach (Emerald Publishing 2018) Hal 
Draper; Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution I: State and Bureaucracy; (Monthly Review Press, 1978)
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modity in the first place. Whereas for pre-critical political economy ‘value' is said to reside 
in the commodity, for critical political economy, ‘value’ resides in labour (hence, Marx’s 
reference to commodities as ‘congealed labour time’).  
3
This pre-critical notion of seeing the social world as conflictual relations centred around 
the exchange of commodities leads to the belief that ‘wealth’ is created by labour as ‘fin-
ished product’, which is then ‘extracted’ or ‘stolen’ by someone external to the labour 
process itself (i.e. the capitalist ). From this view of the matter, it follows that all that is 
needed to remedy this act of ‘theft’ and to usher in an era of economic and social justice 
is for labour to supplant the class ‘external’ to it and hold on to the ‘wealth’ it has by its 
own labouring efforts, created.

In the discussion that follows, my focus is on those concepts that Lexit sees as central to 
its criticism of the European Union and which draws upon pre-critical political economic 
ways of thinking. The concepts to be discussed include, ‘neoliberalism’, ‘financialisation’ 
‘the Elite’ and ‘British workers’. The chapter is organised as follows. I begin with a brief 
discussion of the precursor and contemporary meaning of Lexit (sections ii and iii). I move 
on to discuss Lexit’s criticism of the European Union’s economic dimension (section iv). In 
this section, the concept of ‘financialisation’ takes centre stage. This section is followed 
by Lexit’s adoption of the language of ‘the elite’ and ‘the British people’ and/or ‘British 
workers’ (section v). Each section concludes with the shortcomings of Lexit’s mystifica-
tions and their consequences for the potential post-Lexit era.

 Karl Marx; Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Capital, Volume I. (first published, 3
1867,Trans. Ben Fowkes. Penguin Books. 1990). 325. See also Bolton and Pitts ibid.
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ii. Lexit’s Precursor : ’The European Question’ and the 1975 EEC Referendum

Lexit’s retreat into ‘the nation’ as the bulwark for a ‘national-progressive’ or ‘socialist’ 
strategy against the unchecked capitalism of ‘Europe’ is neither new nor novel. It has 
been an integral element in the history of the left of the Labour Party’s anti-European 
wing. It is as present today as it was at the time of the UK’s entry into the then EEC and 
the referendum that followed in 1975. It is this history that the socialist critic, Tom Nairn 
drew attention to in his 1972 extended essay, The European Question.  In discussing this 4
history, Nairn highlights this left-nationalism’s moral, populist tone that, again, is not with-
out relevance today.

Writing of his times, Nairn notes the ‘national ruling-class’s’ rejection of nationalism in 
recognising that their interests (or dominant sections within it) lay with the EEC and that it 
was the Labour Party that ‘picked up [the class’s nationalist] clothes and wore them’. He 
continues,

In spite of the strong and still lively tradition of ethical international-
ism and high-mindedness towards ‘narrow chauvinism’, Labour de-
fended national sovereignty and ‘our’ absolute ‘right to control our 
own affairs against ruling-class ‘sell-out’. Abandoned by the right, 
nationalism was embraced by the great party of ‘the left’. 
5
That the right-wing of the Labour party should embrace nationalism was then, as now, 
not surprising. Adopting the mantle of a ‘national party’ offered reassurance that a party 
of sectional interests (the working-class and the labour movement) could be trusted to 
defend that national interest when trusted with the reins of government. As Nairn phrases 
 Tom Nairn, ‘The European Question’; [1972] New Left Review 754
 ibid; 375
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it, Labour needed to appear ‘plus royalist que le Roi’.  If this explanation solves the para6 -
dox of the Labour right’s embrace of nationalism, why then did nationalism become an 
option for the seemingly internationalist left?

In answering this question, Nairn explores the nature and history of the Labour Party in 
some depth. For present purposes, however, one factor stands out. Unlike the crude na-
tionalism of the political right, Labour’s left sees itself as not just the representative but as 
the  embodiment of the nation’s ‘moral goodness’, if not its godliness.,

It is a part of every self-respecting nation-state spirit to have a popu-
lar dimension, a mass psychology to some degree independent of 
the existing nation-state institutions and ‘higher culture’. The most 
rooted conviction of this popular nationalism is often that it, and it 
alone, represents the true nation - the enduring uncorrupted national 
soul which has constantly to stand up against betrayal from above. 
7
This ideal of the ‘true’ nation is posited in opposition to and as a rejection of the reality of 
the modern, rational nation-state,

While Labour’s right wing surrenders to the way of the world, its left 
remains true to the way of the spirit. The former is the nation of 
Mammon and force, of capitalism and the State; the latter is the na-
tion of spiritual equality and community, of commanding moral prin-
ciple and righteous example. 
8
 ibid; 106
 ibid, 467
 ibid, 488
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It is these oppositions between ideal and material, between the ‘spiritual nation’ and the 
‘political nation’, between ‘community’ and ‘Mammon, capitalism and the State’ that is 
articulated through Lexit’s return to a pre-critical political economy at the expense of its 
critical reformulations. Yet, as will become apparent, this return brings with it echoes of 
Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment whereby all that is considered wrong with the con-
temporary elements is projected and personified onto an ‘other’ and defined as ‘evil’  so 
that all that remains is adopted and personified as ‘good’.  It is this attempt to come to 9
the matter with ‘clean hands’ that may go some way to accounting for Lexit’s unacknowl-
edged troubling echoes of the past. 
10
iii What is Lexit?

In what sounds like a contemporary example of Orwellian Newspeak, Lexit presents itself 
as the left or socialist argument for the UK withdrawing from the European Union. Its core 
belief is that the European Union (at least from the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), if not be-
fore) must be understood as a ‘neoliberal project’. Costas Lapavitas offers this descrip-
tion of neoliberalism,

Neoliberalism is an ideology that is hard to define accurately. It is 
marked by a strong belief in the merits of free markets and private 
enterprise, coupled with an equally strong antipathy toward the pub-
lic sector, collective agencies and organised labour. 
11
 Genealogy and me9
 Frederiche Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals; First published, 1887, Vintage, 1989; David 10
M. Seymour, 	 "The Slave, the Noble and the Jews: Reflections on Section 7 of "On the Genea-
logy of Morals" in Tony Kushner and Nadioa Valman, ‘Philosemitism, Antisemitism and the Jews, 
(Dartmouth 2005).
 Matt Bolton and Frederick Harry Pitts, Corbynism: A Critical Approach (Emerald Publishing 11
2018)
	 	  5
The development of these neoliberal baselines and antipathies now said to be embodied 
in the European Union resulted in the demise of the commitments to the previous era of 
Keynesian social democracy. Adoption of neoliberalism at both the national and European 
level brought with it, therefore, cuts in public spending (most notably, welfare provision), 
the end of nationalisation and state aid for industry and have been substituted by the 
push towards privatisation and the ascendancy of financialisation (finance capital and 
speculation).

Institutionally, these facets of neoliberalism are expressed through a decrease in democ-
ratic control and oversight of national and EU institutions in general and, more specifical-
ly, those overtly related to finance; the European Central Bank and the Bank of England 
along with the emerging jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 

It is  Lexit’s criticism of these ‘financial’ or ‘economic’ aspects of the European Union as a 
‘neoliberal project’ that I will now turn.

iv. Lexit’s Economic Mystifications: Financialisation

In this section, I begin by laying out Lexit’s criticism of ‘financialisation’. I move on to dis-
cuss its origins within pre-critical political economy (i.e., the reification of its organising 
concepts and their corresponding abstraction from and masking of the social relations 
which underpin them). From this discussion, I move on to illustrate how these economic 
mystifications are expressed in Lexit’s political formulations. 

Before continuing, however, it is important to note that the undoubted predominance of 
financialisation is not beyond criticism. It is a real phenomenon resulting, from a social 
democratic point of view, in serious negative impacts. The point is that Lexit falls into the 
	 	  6
trap of treating this aspect of the matter as if it were the whole; that is, as if financialisa-
tion exhausts entirely the nature of the European Union’s outlook. Indeed, it would not be 
too much to say that this confusion of part for whole is itself a dimension of the mystifica-
tion that this chapter brings to light.

At the heart of Lexit’s economic criticism of the European Union as a ‘neoliberal project’ is 
a focus on the concept of ‘financialisation’. Financialisation indicates the ascendancy of 
finance capital and speculation at the expense of what is termed ‘industrial capital’ (i.e., 
capital used for the production of goods and services). More specifically, this point arises 
in the notion that financialisation is not only harmful to the UK’s ‘national-progressive 
strategy’ but also, that is an ‘alien’ imposition forced upon the ‘British nation’.

Lexit’s criticism of financialisation and the corresponding ‘autonomy’ of the City of Lon-
don is not new or novel. As Nairn discusses, it was an ingredient of the anti-European 
armoury in the ‘Great Debate’ that took place at the time of Britain’s entry into the then 
EEC. At that time, the City had a number of reasons for the shift in attitude towards join-
ing Europe. Most relevant was the fragility of their role as a ‘clearing house’ for U.S. 
based ‘petro-dollars’, but which, due to a number of contingent events, was on the de-
cline. Entry into Europe offered a new lease of life for the UK’s financial institutions. How-
ever, it was not only the financial houses that saw advantages in looking in that direction. 
A section of British Trade Unions (those representing workers in firms whose domestic 
production was bound for a European market) was also supportive. Yet, as will become 
apparent, this latter reality disappears from view in Lexit’s turn to pre-critical political 
economy. 
12
 Nairn, opp cit and Andrew Mullen, ‘The British left: For and against Europe? A historical survey’ 12
(2007) Capital and Class, 217-231
	 	  7
Echoing Nairn’s distinction between ‘spirit’ and ‘world’, between ‘community’ and the 
‘political-legal nation’, Bolton and Pitts draw attention to Lexit’s populist distinction be-
tween ‘the fake economy’ and ‘the real economy’. The definition is, for present purposes, 
instructive,

The ‘real economy’ which makes actual things [has] been under-
mined by the power, greed and mathematical trickery of financial in-
stitutions [the ‘fake economy’] for whom money seemed to beget 
money, apparently of its own accord. 
13
This almost Shakespearian reference to ‘money seeming to beget money’  evinces the 14
notion of what we can term ‘unproductive’ finance capital standing in almost complete 
isolation and opposition to ‘productive (industrial) capital’. This perception is reinforced 
through reference to the ‘mathematical trickery’ of apparently autonomous ‘financial insti-
tutions’ seemingly divorced from any connection to processes of production which in-
cludes, of course, the presence of work, of labour. It is precisely this image of the distinc-
tion between ‘the real economy’ and ‘the fake economy’ that forms a key plank in Lexit’s 
platform. Thus, speaking on the campaign trail of the 2017 ‘snap-election’, the Lexit-ori-
ented leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, articulated this criticism of financialisa-
tion,

[[Corbyn] railed against the ‘cosy cartel’ who have contracted a 
‘rigged system set up by the wealth extractors for the wealth extrac-
tors’, pinning the blame for Britain’s travails on the ‘morally bank-
rupt’ elite who ‘extract wealth from the pockets of ordinary working 
 Matt Bolton and Frederick Harry Pitts, Corbynism: A Critical Approach (Emerald Publishing 13
2018; 38
 see: The Merchant of Venice; Act 1, Scene III14
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people………Only a [Lexit] government would ‘take on the cosy car-
tels that are hoarding the country’s wealth for themselves’. 
15
This idea of capital as the private property of a detached financial elite parasitically feed-
ing off the ‘real creators’ of wealth (labour) was articulated again some months later in a 
speech given, again by Corbyn, not uncoincidentally, to the EEF, The Manufacturer’s Or-
ganisation Conference in February, 2018. It is in this speech that this general criticism is 
connected to the image of the EU as a ‘neoliberal project’ in general, driven by the as-
cendancy of financialisation, in particular,

At the same time [as ‘Big Bang’ which is considered as the high-wa-
ter mark of the UK’s collusion with the EU’s ‘neoliberal project’] in-
vestment banks began trading in new kinds of financial products, 
packaging up debt in increasingly opaque ways and becoming ever 
removed from the real economy……….…Banks should be helping 
the real economy, not suffocating it………….Out of control financial 
wizardry and gambling were left barely regulated, while the real 
economies in once strong industrial areas were put into managed 
decline. 
16
That Lexit treats this seemingly absolute distinction between the ‘fake economy’ of ‘un-
productive capital’, the alchemy of ‘money begetting money’ through ‘wizardry and gam-
bling’ and the ‘real economy’ of industrial capital - of the production of things and of 
labour, of what in the past has been termed, ‘sweat of the brow’  - as the defining char17 -
 supra note 3 p.20915
 https://labour.org.uk/press/jeremy-corbyn-speech-eef/16
 M. Postone, Anti-Semitism and National Socialism; (Chronos, 2000) 17
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acteristic of the EU’s economic outlook is made plain by the claim that only by withdraw-
ing from the European Union can,

[O]ur economy [take] advantage of new freedoms outside the EU to 
allow government to protect our industrial base. An important step 
towards reprogramming the economy, so that it works for the many 
not the few. We will take decisive action to make finance the servant 
of industry and not the masters of all. 
18
It is here that we can identify Lexit’s mystification of a very real phenomenon through the 
abstraction of socially meaningful concepts from the specific nature of the social relations 
that give them both meaning and content.

It was with Marx’s critique of political economy that its critical roots and the problem with 
the abstract nature of Lexit’s apparently unmediated connection between labour and 
wealth fell into disfavour. In critiques of both ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’ versions  of extant po19 -
litical economy, Marx’s insight was to demystify precisely this connection. One of the 
ways in which he did so was by drawing a distinction between labour in the abstract and 
labour within a historically specific set of social relations; in this instance, capitalist social 
relations. Marx argued that labour as a means to sustain life was universal; that it was, in 
other words, a fact of life or a law of nature. Yet, at the same time, he illustrated that the 
meaning of labour at any given time was dependent upon the broader nexus of social re-
lations in which it was embedded. While it may well have been the case in the past that 
exploitation of labour could be adequately represented by the presence of an external 
force raiding labour to steal the product that the labourer in fact owned, its validity was 
wanting within capitalism. Under capitalism, ‘wealth’ along with all economic concepts 
 ibid18
 It is interesting to note that Marx tended to vent his hallmark caustic wit more on the radicals 19
(i.e. Proudhon, Say and others) than the liberals (Smith, Ricardo, etc.).
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such as ‘labour’, ‘value’, ‘capital’, ‘exchange-value’, ‘money’ is given meaning only when 
understood within the context of the entirety of the capitalist social relations of exchange, 
relations that reach deep within the labour process itself. 
20
The consequences of these insights, therefore, pull the rug from under Lexit’s strict bifur-
cation of the social world between ‘wealth-creators’ (the many) and ‘wealth-
extractors’ (the few). One of the enduring advances, therefore, of Marx’s critical political 
economy over its pre-critical (and current Lexit) misapprehensions was that the expropria-
tion of wealth and its conflicts are not a phenomenon external to the labour process - of 
someone ‘picking the pockets of ordinary working people’ and ‘hoarding it for them-
selves’ - but rather are internal to it.

From the persecutive of critical political economy and its emancipatory potential, the short-
comings of a call for a ‘reprogramming of the economy’ through the ‘freedoms’ Lexit 
claim will follow withdrawal from the EU rests on a conception of labour and wealth that 
remain uncriticised and mystified. It is in this context that Lexit’s economic mystifications 
run the risk of reproducing the very problems that it believes that it has uncovered. Most 
notable of these possibilities relates to the post-Lexit ‘freedom’ to nationalise; a ‘freedom’ 
in which a national state is reduced to little more than an administrative elite and for 
whom the labour process at its disposal offers a ready source of ‘state income’ through 
an expropriation of the finished product (while leaving the nature  of the labour process 
unchallenged).

As such, Lexit offers two related images.  The first is the ‘fake economy’ built upon predatory,

 supra note 3 pp. 121-16120
	 	  11
parasitic, alien, unproductive, non-national and self-serving intangible financial capital, 
whose modus operandi is ‘wizardry and trickery’. The second is the ‘real economy’, an 
organic, labour-oriented, non-exploitative, productive, national economy centred on the 
making of tangible things  with the modus operandi of ‘sweat of the brow’ and an ‘honest 
days work’. This characterisation of the economy is not only the consequence of a return 
to pre-critical political economy but also makes a connection with a particularly noxious 
strain of English radicalism. As Nairn implies, it was within this tradition that a xenophobic 
undercurrent can be detected and that is still discernible today. Here, one need only think 
of Shakespeare or William Blake through to T.S. Elliot and E.P. Thompson’s reflections of 
the Muggletonians and the role ‘the Jew’ that plays in each of their national imaginings. 
21
Although it would be an error to drape Lexit in the robes of a historic radical antisemitic 
nationalism, it is relevant, nonetheless, to acknowledge the echo of the past in the  Lexit 
present. These echoes can be found to various degrees in the return at the margins of the 
figure of ‘the Rothschilds’ as the embodiment and personification of the spectre of in-
ternational finance and speculation within the darker reaches of social media.  More 22
mainstream, however, is the troubling, ‘dog whistle’ anti-immigration imagery of a 2018 
Labour Party video in which the voice-over accompanying an image of the British coast 
with the sea lapping against the shore speaks of the country ‘having lost control’.   
23
The salience of these echoes are present in an even more disturbing manner when placed 
in the context of the ‘real’ and ‘fake’ economies that have become a staple of the Lexit 
 For a discussion of the Christian roots of the Labour Party, Nairn, ibid. See also, Robert Fine, 21
The Rule of Law and Muggletonian Marxism: The Perplexities of Edward Thompson’ [1994] 
Journal of Law and Society, 21; 193-213
 For the political right, this position is granted to that of ‘George Soros’.22
 Indeed, the video as a whole can be interpreted as encapsulating much of what has been dis23 -
cussed here. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpCRQZiQ6Y8 
	 	  12
canon. More specifically, these legacies of the past re-emerge in the implication of the ‘in-
ternationalisation’ of ‘the few’ over the ‘nationalisation’ of the ‘many’; or, in other terms, 
the internationalism of ‘the elite’ over the ‘Britishness’ of ‘The People’. It is to these points 
that I will now turn.

v. Lexit’s Political Mystifications: The ‘Internationalism’ of The Elite’ and the ‘Nationalism’ 
of ‘British Workers’ 
Just as in the realm of economics, Lexit’s criticism turns on the pre-critical political econ-
omy structure of ‘relations between things’, so too does it in the realm of politics. This 
pre-critical approach again differs from its critical variant in which politics remains as the 
expression of the totality of social relations brought about by the historically specific ‘rela-
tions between people mediated by things’. The result of this difference is that, whereas 
critical political economy understands the political organisation (including its political in-
stitutions) as imbricated within and articulating the specific nature and content of con-
temporary social relations (including, of course, conflicts of interests inherent in those re-
lations),  Lexit’s reliance on pre-critical political economy replicates its economic criti24 -
cism of financialisation. It mystifies political concepts (i.e. the state and civil society) by 
abstracting them from the social relations in which they are embedded. More specifically, 
in keeping with Lexit’s image of an almost absolute division between ‘wealth extractors’ 
and ‘wealth creators’, so too is the relationship between state and civil society  divided 
and opposed. The abstracted ‘state’ becomes an external force bearing down upon an 
equally abstracted ‘civil society’ For Lexit, therefore, where ‘emancipation’  means the 
freeing of labour (or, rather the products of labour) from its expropriators, the ‘freedom’ of 
civil society is believed to be dependant  upon throwing off the ‘shackles of the state’.

 Supra note 224
	 	  13
As we have seen, like pre-critical political economy reflections on economics, at the level 
of politics, the world appears as divided between those who own property (what was re-
ferred to above as the ‘wealth-extractors’) and those whose property in the product (the 
‘wealth-creators’) they have expropriated. Further, at the moment of exchange, what was 
considered up to that point communal property (i.e. the property of labour as a ‘class’) 
becomes the private property of the capitalist so that the former is dispossessed en 
masse. The consequence of this transaction, therefore, is the presence of a propertyless 
mass set against a now propertied class of private owners. This pre-critical image of the 
relation between labour and capital which underpins Lexit’s understanding of 
‘economics’, informs also its political thinking in which, in place of the state and civil so-
ciety, the division between ‘the elite’ and the people’ plays a central role

While this form of criticism underpins Lexit’s political understanding in general, its con-
ceptual language alters in important ways when confronting the European Union. Even 
though its negative approach to the EU remains tied to its retreat into pre-critical political 
economy, it substitutes its concepts of state and civil society for the language of ‘the 
elite’ and ‘the British People’ and/or ‘British workers’. The consequence of this shift is, 
however, more than cosmetic. In the context of Lexit’s criticism of the European Union, 
this conceptual shift introduces a further dimension of mystification; it characterises the 
‘wealth creators’ as ‘British’ and the ‘wealth extractors’ as ‘non-national Europeans’.  
25
It is through consideration of Mitchell and Fazi’s recent work, Reclaiming the State: A 
Progressive View of Sovereignty for a Post-Liberal World that we can trace the trajectory 
 It is this division that represents one of the common ground between Lexit and Brexit. See, 25
David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics; (C. 
Hurst and Co.; 2017) and Theresa May ‘Citizens of Nowhere speech’; Conservative Party Confer-
ence, 2015 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-
full/
	 	  14
from an analysis grounded in critical political economy to one that reverts to pre-critical 
reformulations. Again, I conclude the section by noting the potential this analysis, and the 
mystifications it presents, has for reproducing in a post-Lexit era the very problems it 
claims to have resolved.

A theme common to much Lexit thinking is the substitution of critical political economy’s 
concepts of ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ for a pre-critical notion of ‘the elite’ and ‘the British 
People/Workers’. This transformation is said to be a consequence of what Mitchell and 
Fazi term, the depoliticisation of politics  and the  corresponding neutralising of social 26
(i.e. class) conflict; a consequence that is also said to account for the dissolution of the 
UK’s national sovereignty. 

A ‘soft’ version of these developments appears in the idea that formerly independent na-
tion-states are more or less powerless to challenge the European Union’s neoliberal 
commitments. The arguments for this viewpoint are well-rehearsed. Should a nation-state 
refuse or fail to fall into line, it is subject to formal discipline at the hands of the ECJ or, 
informally, through the threat of the loss of capital investment and the negative impact of 
financial speculation. The dice appear loaded from the start in such a way that following 
the European status quo is the course of least resistance.

In rejecting this standard account Mitchell and Fazi provide a more nuanced reading.  They draw 
attention to the active complicity of the nation-state in what they see as its disavowal of 
national sovereignty. They argue by analogy that just as the laissez-faire of the past de-
pended on government activism, so too does compliance with contemporary European 
neoliberalism require government intervention. 

 William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi; Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for 26
a Post-Liberal World (Pluto Press 2017)
	 	  15
At the level of the national state, the authors suggest, this collaboration with the EU’s ‘ne-
oliberal project’ is accompanied by what they term, the depoliticisation of politics. In 
short, depoliticisation points to a passing of domestic matters from the nation-state to the 
European Union. It thereby places nation-states into the hands of an administrative, tech-
nocratic elite freed from national political accountability and brings with it a correspond-
ing disavowal of national sovereignty within the EU’s neoliberal framework.

The trajectory of Mitchell and Fazi’s explanation for what they see as the nation-state’s 
own relinquishing of its national sovereignty to politically unaccountable administrative 
elites follows the contours of the shift from critical political economy to its pre-critical 
predecessor. Mitchell and Fazi’s account of this depoliticisation of politics begins by 
drawing attention to the conflict between capital and labour. They argue that the repudia-
tion of British sovereignty within a neoliberal European integrationist framework was both 
a consequence and response to threats of capital accumulation brought about by the as-
cendancy of working-class contestation during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Beginning as an 
economic conflict involving Trade Unions and other social groups, it took on a political 
complexion through those groups’ direct confrontation with the State. Depoliticisation 
and disavowal of national sovereignty served to take the sting out of these challenges 
and by design served to neutralise the overtly political threat it posed.

This outcome was achieved by freeing economic and social policies from direct state 
control by granting autonomy to the Bank of England on the model of the European Cen-
tral Bank. This move not only had the consequence of depoliticising political decisions 
necessary for the restoration of capital accumulation, but also for shifting responsibility 
for the unpopularity of these measures (i.e. cuts to public spending (including welfare), 
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high unemployment, denationalisation and privatisation, etc.) onto seemingly ‘apolitical’, 
‘technocratic’ and unaccountable elites. More often than not, justification for these poli-
cies was offered in the name of the European Union and of the needs of integration into 
European networks. Releasing these decisions from national, democratic oversight per-
mitted highly unpopular and hitherto unacceptable political, economic and social policies 
to be adopted and accepted as a matter of EU necessity without apparent cost to the 
governments of the day.

In explaining these developments, Mitchell and Fazi note the paradox of depoliticisation. 
Although reallocating some of the responsibility for its decision-making to a presumed 
UK/EU imperative and, from the popular perspective, making the national state appear 
weaker than before, it allowed the nation-state’s interests to withstand the threats brought 
about by social contestation. Understood in this way, therefore, Mitchell and Fazi con-
clude,

[T]he current treaties [of the EU] now use the State as an instrument 
to advance neoliberalism and repress social democratic leanings.  
27
It is here that we can begin to see the correspondence between Lexit’s economic and its 
political thinking. Mitchell and Fazi present an image of the EU-UK relationship as that of 
an external unaccountable elite, organising and feeding off of its freely gifted prey; a ‘rela-
tionship’ that when read through the prism of Lexit becomes the divide between a  ‘Eu-
ropean elite’ and ‘The British People’.

The of an apparent homogeneity of interests between British capital and the European 
Union’s technocratic elite on the one side, that is opposed to an ‘externalised’, equally 
 ibid p.14327
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apparent homogeneity of the interests of ‘The British People’ on the other side, appears 
overtly in Lexit’s more populist rhetoric. For example, in a speech offering assurance that 
the Labour Party would respect and progress the June 2016 referendum, result, the 
shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John McDonnell stated that, to do otherwise,

[W]ould put us against the majority of the British People and on the 
side of certain corporate elites, who have always had the British 
people at the back of the queue. 
28
The implication of the ‘corporate elite’ as non-national and the promoters of neoliberal 
policies of the European Union was expanded upon in a later speech by the Party leader. 
While McDonnell’s comments can be seen as residing in the tradition of left-nationalism, 
Jeremy Corbyn aims more directly at the European Union. Offering an image of life after 
Lexit, he assures ‘the British people’ that,

What there wouldn’t be is the wholesale importation of underpaid 
workers from Central Europe in order to destroy conditions. My 
point is that employers, particularly in the construction industry, oth-
ers as well, recruit overseas in order to bring in the whole group of 
workers to destroy existing wages and working conditions, so Mike 
Ashley can bring in workers to Sports Direct to pay grotesquely low 
wages and appalling working conditions. 
29
Apparent immediately is the almost conspiratorial image  of the immense harm that the 30
neoliberal European Union is said to be inflicting on ‘British workers’ (who now seamless-
ly take the place of McDonnell’s ‘the British people’). The responsibility for the ‘driving 
https://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-corbyn-itv-transcript-labours-approach-to-brexit-im28 -
migration-wages-housing-2017-1
 ibid 29
 On the question of the left and conspiracy thinking, see Bolton and Pitts, ibid 207-25130
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down of wages’ and the ‘destruction of working conditions’ is now allocated to an exter-
nal, predatory, alien and self-serving European sanctioned economic and political elite 
rather than as the consequence of the complexity inherent within the nature of capitalist 
social relations.

In this context, it is of note that Corbyn’s specific target is two of the ‘four freedoms’ en-
shrined within the European Union. In effect, and, again, not without a hint of conspiracy, 
Corbyn is laying responsibility for what he sees as a ‘pincer movement’  of both the 31
‘freedom of capital’ and ‘the freedom of movement of labour’. Moreover, the parasitic na-
ture of this image is reinforced by the phrase of premeditated intent, ‘in order to’, with the 
implication that the sole intent of these freedoms is to harm ‘British workers’. 

Presented in these terms, Lexit’s image of the European Union is little more than an insti-
tution operating as an instrument for a technocratic elite working in alliance with an un-
tethered, non-national, corporate elite against the material interests of ‘British workers’.

Like the mystification of financialisation, the mystifications identified within Lexit’s political 
criticisms of the European Union as a ‘neoliberal project’, run the potential risk of repro-
ducing themselves when put into practice in a post-Lexit era. 

This potential is inherent in Lexit’s reversion to a pre-critical political economy in which 
the masking of social relations leads to an understanding of the social world and its con-
flicts as an external confrontation between two seemingly unrelated, independent, unified 
and homogenous bodies; on the one side, the ‘European elite’ parasitically feeding off, 
on the other side, ‘British workers’

 Ivan Krastev, After Europe, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017)31
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This observation leads, in turn, to the second moment of mystification; that of the divide 
between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’. Lexit’s presentation of the EU as a ‘neoliberal project’ 
appears as emerging simultaneously from a specific moment in the always fluid, always 
contested, social relations between capital and labour while at the same time escaping 
from them. It implies that following the period of increasing social and political contesta-
tion, capital and the state not only break free of their adversary (organised labour) but in 
so doing, put an end to those social relations in which both parties are co-joined in a rela-
tionship, albeit a conflictual one.

However, this eschewal of social relations not only mystifies the relations that give rise to 
and bind the parties together, but it also mystifies and makes invisible the relations and 
the corresponding conflicts that are internal to each group. In keeping with Lexit’s insis-
tence on the effacement of vertical social relations (i.e. between ‘the European elite’ and 
‘the British People’), we see also an effacement of horizontal relations (i,e within each 
group) and which manifest themselves as conflicts of interest.  It is this mystification of 
horizontal relations that carry the potential for Lexit’s reproduction of, rather than a chal-
lenge to, the undemocratic and anti-democratic tendencies within the depoliticisation of 
politics and its realignment of the political world into ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’.

If it is the case that Lexit’s image of ‘the British people’ was correct and that it was in fact 
homogenous in the sense of an absence of conflicting interests, then the need for politics 
and political institutions as the means and site for mediating these conflicts disappear. All 
that is needed is for that presumed unity of interests - the ‘will of the people’ - to be ad-
ministered. It follows that because of its hermetic nature, those who would fulfil this  non-
political administrative role could only arise from the body of ‘the people’ itself. Moreover, 
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as administration, it would be bereft of democratic scrutiny and accountability. It would, in 
other words, give rise to a maxim common to pre-capital political economy’s idealism; 
that of ‘the replacement of the government by the administration of things’.Hal Draper 
notes the dangers in this formulation. He writes,

This [maxim] is usually taken as a laudable sentiment meaning the 
abolition of the rule of man over men; but, in fact, [pre-critical politi-
cal economy’s] highly despotic schemes showed [it] to mean, in its 
governments, something quite different; the administration of men 
as if they were things. 
32
It is not coincidental that Lexit’s reversion to pre-critical political economy offers an inkling 
of this potential arising in practice. Here, all one need do is recall the attempt following 
the June 2016 referendum to grant all power to the Executive to administer the UK’s exit 
from the European Union free from Parliamentary oversight; the failure of which through 
the oversight of the Supreme Court was met with the headline in one Brexit-oriented pa-
per declaring the judges to be nothing other than ‘Enemies of the People’.  Similarly, the 33
use of the referendum to decide the issue of withdrawal itself is one that has a history 
linked to undemocratic and antidemocratic movements and regimes through its claims 
that ‘the people’s will’ is embodied within the person of the leader, and also, by the reduc-
tion of its ‘democratic’ input to a single moment in the paradoxical formulation of  a call to 
vote now not to vote again. or, in other words, adopting the chimera of democracy to cur-
tail democracy. 
34
 Hal Draper; Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution Vol IV Critique of Other Socialisms (Monthly Re32 -
view Press 1990
 Daily Mail 4th November, 2016, see https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/en33 -
emies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-react-judges-brexit-ruling
See; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. (University of Chicago) 1996 34
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Conclusion 
At the core of these mystifications of critical political economy is that Lexit’s lexicon of 
concepts rest on their abstraction. As a result, rather than overcoming the shortcomings 
Lexit believes it has identified, it runs the risks of reproducing them. The reason for these 
concerns arises from Lexit’s inability to escape its pre-critical origins that have mystified 
rather than illuminated the nature of the contemporary world and the issues at stake.

Foremost of these shortcomings is that the concepts Lexit adopt rest upon a failure to 
recognise the social relations of which they are a part. As a consequence of this failure, 
Lexit presents the social world as an external clash between two fully-formed, au-
tonomous and homogenous bodies. It is this Mancihean conflict that lies at the root of 
Lexit’s criticism of the UK’s relationship with the European Union. As we have seen, over-
laying and reproducing Lexit’s fundamental division between that of ‘wealth creators’ and 
‘wealth extractors’ are those of ‘industrial capital’ over ‘financial capital’; ‘British workers’ 
against ‘cosy cartels’ and ‘corporate elites’; and ‘the British people’ against ‘European, 
technocratic, administrative elites’. This view permits and underpins Lexit’s claim that by 
casting off the shackles of the latter, the ‘green and pleasant lands’ of a New Jerusalem 
will emerge.

From a critical perspective, the shortcoming of this image rests on Lexit leaving its organ-
ising concepts uncriticised. It is, moreover, by failing to recognise the presence of conflict 
within rather than between its conceptual oppositional structure as if all that is good is the 
property of one and all that is evil the property of its oppositional other, it mystifies the 
players and the political economy in which they relate. I argue that it is this mystification 
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that leads to Lexit’s fate in replicating rather than overcoming the problems it has claim to 
identify.

The European Union and the UK’s relationship with it is, of course, not beyond criticism. 
However, by mystifying the nature of that relationship, Lexit falls short.
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